HOLDRs, a type of basket security, enable investors to purchase an entire industry sector with one transaction. Subrahmanyam (1991) models the theoretical interplay of different sources of information in a multiple-security market that includes a basket of securities that trades as a single security. Most empirical studies find that the basket, usually a futures contract, leads the index, a finding that contradicts the predictions of Subrahmanyam's model. We examine HOLDR basket securities and the underlying stocks and find evidence that strongly supports Subrahmanyam's theoretical model. The price of the portfolio of underlying securities is more informative than and leads the HOLDR (basket) price. 
Introduction
Innovative financial instruments provide investors with opportunities to hedge risks, speculate on market changes, and invest in industry sectors while minimizing transaction costs. Baske t securities, exchange traded securities that represent a claim on a portfolio of underlying securities, are one increasingly popular innovative instrument. The introduction of these basket securities whose prices are derived from the prices of the underlying securities raises important questions, including, for example, what is the justification for the creation of the bundled security? In which market does the price discovery take place? What is the effect on liquidity of the underlying securities when a security basket is introduced? Which instrument is optimal for trading?
Theoretical models suggest one set of answers, with varying support from empirical findings.
The theoretical work of Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) suggests that baskets of securities provide a preferred trading medium for uninformed liquidity traders who wish to trade portfolios, because adverse selection costs are typically lower in these markets than they are in markets for individual securities. Low transaction costs are one of the reasons for the popularity of stock index-futures.
However, Subrahmanyam also shows that theoretically the price of the basket security should be less informative than the price of the equivalent portfolio of underlying individual securities. Furthermore, the returns of this portfolio should lead those of the basket security. However, empirical evidence to date suggests otherwise. Index-futures prices in particular are more informative and lead the prices of the underlying portfolio (see e.g. Chan (1992) , Kawaller et al. (1987) , Stoll and Whaley (1990) , MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) , Wahab and Lashgari (1993) , Harris, Sofianos and Shapiro (1994) , Choi and Subrahmanyam (1994) , Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1996) , and Chu, Hsieh and Tse (1999) ).
A number of reasons have been proposed as to why the empirical evidence contradicts the theoretical predictions. First, Subrahmanyam (1991) suggests that institutional frictions, such as nonsynchronous trading in the underlying stocks, may explain the lead of the index futures price over the index cash price. Second, Kawaller et al. (1987) propose that informed traders prefer trading futures so they can leverage to generate a higher return on investment. Third, Fleming et al. (1996) argue that transaction costs are very low for futures relative to the portfolio of individual securities and this will also attract traders with market-wide information. Fourth, futures are not subject to the up-tick rule, which specifies that a short sale of a security can take place only when the last recorded stock price change is non-negative. Hence, futures prices should more efficiently incorporate information during a market downturn.
This reasoning suggests the choice of futures as the basket security biases empirical work against finding support for Subrahmanyam's theory. HOLDRs provide the opportunity to conduct a more adequate empirical test of Subrahmanyam's theory because they conform closely to the assumptions on which his theoretical work is based. 90 percent versus 10 percent for the basket. We also find that the portfolio lead is stronger than the basket lead. For the SMH HOLDR, regressing the 10-second basket return on the lagged 10-second portfolio return results in an average coefficient of 0.532, compared to 0.130 for the lead from the basket to the portfolio. Related studies such as Chu et al. (1999) and Hasbrouck (2003) consider index-futures, ETFs and the cash index.
These studies conclude that the three assets contribute to price discovery in the above order, though ETFs and the cash index are very close. For HOLDRs there is no futures contract affecting the analysis 2 .
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section two describes the theoretical model of Subrahmanya m and the propositions regarding price discovery in security baskets vis-à-vis the underlying security portfolio. Section three discusses the methodology employed to test the hypotheses regarding price discovery. Section four presents the sample characteristics of the data. Section five presents the results and Section six concludes.
Theory and hypotheses
In Subrahmanyam's model there exists a market for N individual securities and a basket security comprising these securities. The basket security has a liquidation payoff 2 We only found two studies that examine HOLDRs. Solodar and Seiler (2001) consider pricing, finding that HOLDRs trade at a substantial discount, an assertion not corroborated by our findings, nor those of Engle and Sarkar (2002) , who find that ETFs do not trade at a discount due to the creation and redemption facility a llowing arbitrage opportunities. Second, Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) identical to the weighted average of the payoffs of the individual securities. In each market, risk-neutral informed traders and liquidity traders are assumed to submit their orders to risk-neutral market makers who set prices expecting to earn zero economic profits, similar to the assumptions of Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) .
There are two types of liquidity traders in this market: discretionary and nondiscretionary. Discretionary liquidity traders wish to trade in several securities simultaneously, and strategically choose to conduct their trades either in the individual securities or in a basket of these securities, depending on where their losses to informed traders are minimized. Non-discretionary liquidity traders are exogenously constrained to trade a given order size in either a particular security or the basket.
Informed traders choose their trades strategically while rationally taking into account the effect their trades will have on prices. Informed traders either possess security-specific information or private information about the systematic factor that drives the security prices and hence the basket value. In this model the liquidation value of security i is given by
where S t,i is the value of security i at end of period t, β i is the sensitivity of the value of security i to the common factor return f t , and ε t,i is the security? -specific component of the price innovation of security i.
The value of the basket is given by:
where w i is the weight of security i in the basket M such that 0 < w i < 1 and 1
Informed traders observe signals correlated with ε t,i (i=1, …, N) or f t at time t−1 and take positions in individual securities and the basket based on their private information. Specifically, traders with security-specific information about security i are assumed to observe εt,i + ut,i, where var(uit) = θi, and the factor-informed traders are assumed to observe f t + ν t , where var(ν t ) = κ. All liquidity trades, security value innovations, and signal noises are serially uncorrelated, mutually independent, and multivariate normally distributed with zero mean. Private information is thus useful for only one period. Note that despite the fact that they do not possess information about the systematic factor, risk-neutral informed traders will find it profitable to submit orders in the basket as well as in the individual securities about which they are informed, because possessing information about a security is equivalent to possessing noisy information about the basket (especially for securities that have a large basket weight w i ). (Subrahmanyam, 1991, p. 35) .
Several of the propositions
When factor sensitivities are all of the same sign, the price of the portfolio is less noisy in the systematic component than the price of the basket because there is a diversification effect of the uncorrelated non-discretionary trades in the securities. This effect reduces the noise induced by the perfectly correlated trades of the factor-informed traders in the portfolio relative to the basket. If the price of the basket and the price of the portfolio are equally informative in the security-specific component, but the price of the basket is less informative in the systematic component, then the price of the portfolio is more informative than the price of the basket. Our first hypothesis is a direct consequence of Subrahmanyam's proposition 5:
The price of the portfolio is more informative than the price of the basket.
We test this hypothesis using Hasbrouck's (1995) information share, which according to hypothesis 1 should be larger for the portfolio than for the basket. In
Hasbrouck's terminology there is one efficient price (the value S M in the present context) and the information share measures how much each market contributes in terms of longrun impact on this efficient price.
The tendency of movements in one price to provide predictive information about subsequent movements in another price is commonly termed a "lead-lag" relationship. Subrahmanyam (1991) analyzes the regression coefficient of the one -period ahead price changes on the current period's price changes. This leads to his proposition 11:
"If the factor sensitivities β i are all of the same sign, the lead from the portfolio to the basket is larger than that from the basket to the portfolio.
Movements in both the price of the basket and the price of the portfolio provide information about subsequent movements in the price of the other" (Subrahmanyam, 1991, p. 43 ).
This leads us directly to our second hypothesis:
The lead from the portfolio to the basket is larger than that from the basket to the portfolio.
Note that hypothesis 2 is about short-term leads and lags, which are potentially transitory, whereas hypothesis 1 concerns the relative long-run impact of information innovation on prices.
Interestingly, many studies refer to Subrahmanyam's work to provide a reason for the popularity of futures trading, but none refer to his propositions on price discovery, even though some of them do study lead-lags between index-futures and the index.
Subrahmanyam comments on the conflict between his theory and the empirical evidence, writing:
"The result, however, is inconsistent with the study of Kawaller, Koch, and Koch (1987) (Subrahmanyam, 1991, p. 43) .
The information share
We use quotes rather than trades to calculate the information share of HOLDRs and synthetic HOLDRs, or, in the wording of Subrahmanyam, the basket (HOLDR) and the portfolio (synthetic HOLDR). Hasbrouck (1995) 
If the prices are cointegrated, the returns should be represented by an error correction model (Engle and Granger, 1987) of the following form:
where µ is a (4,1) vector of parameters, Γk are (4,4) matrices of parameters, K is the laglength, ε t is a (4,1) error vector with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Ω and ∆ is the difference-operator, e. g. ∆p t = p t -p t -1 . The adjustment coefficient, α, is a (4,3) matrix. E[β'p t ] captures systematic differences in the prices (such as the difference between a bid and offer quote). Following the standard in the literature of estimating E[β'pt] by the sample average β'pt prior to estimating the other parameters, equation (4) can be estimated using linear least squares.
The vector error correction model in equation (4) has a common trends representation (Johansen, 1991) :
where p 0 is a constant (4,1) vector, and C(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator, e. g. Lp t = p t-1 . The impact matrix C represents the long-run impact of a disturbance on each of the four prices. It is given by (6) is a scalar and we know β⊥ has four identical elements equal to one half, so, using the notation α ⊥ = (a 1 a 2 a 3 a 4 )', C is a (4,4) matrix with four identical rows, c, such that ( )(
Hasbrouck ( Finally, to test hypothesis 2, we compute the lead and the lag as the regression coefficient of the forecast of one-period ahead price changes on the current period's price changes. Thus, the measures of lead and lag are defined as follows:
A large ξ H relative to ξ S would imply a large lead of the basket security (HOLDR) over the portfolio of individual securities (synthetic HOLDR) and vice versa. Hypothesis 2 predicts ξ H < ξ S . We can test the null hypothesis that ξ H = ξ S using the statistic
where (4) and n is the number of prices. For this problem, n = 4, so, for example, with 60 lags we have 960 parameters. To manage the dimensions of the problem, we use polynomial distributed lags as in Hasbrouck (1995 Hasbrouck ( , 2003 ; using a fivesecond frequency, second-degree polynomial distributed lags are imposed on lags 1-6, 7-12, 13-30, 31-60, 61-90, and 91-120 (i. e. up to 10 minutes). 
Data

Results
The results of Hasbrouck's information share for the SMH HOLDR are provided in Table 4 .
-Insert Table 4 Table 5 shows the results of the lead-lag test for the SMH HOLDR. Regressing the lagged synthetic HOLDR returns on the HOLDR returns produces an average coefficient of 0.532 (0.551) at the 10-second (20-second) frequency. For all days this coefficient is significantly larger (at the 5% significance level) than the average coefficient of 0.130 (0.149) that results from regressing the lagged HOLDR return on the synthetic HOLDR return. This result strongly supports our second hypothesis, that the lead from the portfolio (synthetic HOLDR) to the basket (HOLDR) is larger than the lead from the basket to the portfolio.
-Insert Table 5 about here -
The results for the BBH HOLDR in Tables 6 and 7 On all days the portfolio lead is significantly larger than the basket lead, again strong evidence in support of hypothesis 2.
-Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here -
Conclusions
The theoretical model of Subrahmanyam (1991) 
